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~t_4IJRRENT economic policy in the United States
is set in a very prosperous context, but one with
considerable challenges implicit for the future, In this
presentation I shall first describe the progress of the
economy to date1 and then discuss some possible
problems in the effective use of fiscal and monetary
policy in the future.
L~{~JY TO I).A.tF.;
We are now well into what shapes up as a very
strong expansion by historical standards. In the four
quarters ending with the third quarter of 1972, our
gross national product has grown by over 10 percent,
compared with an average rate of 7.2 percent from
1962 to 1971. Real GNP rose at a 6.4 percent annual
rate in the third quarter of 1972 and at a 9.4 percent
rate in the second quarter. Over the past four quarters
it has risen by 7.2 percent, whereas the average rate
of increase from 1962 to 1971 was 3.8 percent.
On the price front, the GNP deflator rose at a 2.4
percent annual rate in the third quarter of 1972 and
at a 1.8 percent annual rate in the second quarter.
In the past year it has risen by 2.7 percent. This com-
pares with a 3.1 percent average rate from 1962 to
1970 and with a 4.4 percent rate from 1966 to 1970.
The unemployment rate is presently 5.2 percent
and on a downward trend from the 6 percent which
prevailed at the end of last year. In addition to the de-
‘This presentation has been revised to take into accutsot data
available as of December 27, 1972.
dine in unemployment, total employment and the la-
bor force have risen at an unusually rapid pace re-
cently. For instance, from the third quarter of 1971 to
the third quarter of 1972, civilian nondefense employ-
ment increased by more than 2.6 lnilliOn, This increase
is quite large by historical standards. It is roughly
twice as large as the average annual expansion of
nondefense employment from 1964 to 1968, and almost
three times as large as the corresponding expansion
from 1960 to 1964.
In spite of the large increase in employment, the
number of persons unemployed declined by only
222,000 over the same period. This is because the
number of persons’ available for nondefense employ-
ment rose by 2.4 million — an unusually large amount.
In addition to the normal growth of the labor force
of 1.5 million, based on population trends, a rise in
labor force participation rates added 0.4 million and
a decrease in defense employment added slightly
over 0.5 million to the labor force available for non-
defense employment
This trend in labor force expansion continued in
October, when the labor force rose by 227,000 season-
ally adjusted. The full-time civilian labor force rose
by over 600,000 persons in October.
At least in part because of such developments in
the labor force, the combinations of inflation and
unemployment rates attainable from given monetary
and fiscal policy combinations do not now conform
to those predicted from past experience. As a result,
the Administration has continued to emphasize efforts
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to lower unemployment by expanding manpower pro-
grams. The Federal Government is presently spending
$5 billion each year on programs to provide market
information, improved training, assistance for reloca-
tion, and similar services to workers.
While much has been accomplished, a good deal
remains. There is further progress to be made against
unemployment, and price increases need to be kept
moderate. We are starting with an economic expan-
sion which is vigorous and appears broadly based.
The aim of policy is to maintain the present expan-
sion at a high level but within sustainable bounds.
That is, demand and output should be kept rising
as rapidly as is consistent with avoiding unacceptable
inflationary pressures. At the same lime the unemploy-
ment rate should be reduced further.
To accomplish this, an adroit combination of fiscal
and monetary policy will be required so that the
expansion neither lags, causing more unemployment,
nor quickens excessively, bringing accompanying
inflation. In this connection there is a mixed outlook
for fiscal and monetary policy.
F.ISC.TL p~jjry
Fiscal policy has been expansionary recently. The
Federal deficit was $23 billion in fiscal 1971 and $23.2
billion in fiscal 1972, and is estimated to be $25 billion
in fiscal 1973 (based on outlays of $250 billion and
receipts of $225 billion). More recently, the full em-
ployment budget has been in deficit and shows signs
of continuing so, particularly if the Administration’s
proposed spending ceiling (which includes an $18.5
billion increase over fiscal 1972) is not approximated.
There are two important, closely related problems
in the fiscal policy sphere, one of short-run concern
and the second of longer-range import.
While the expansionary posture of fiscal policy is
presently appropriate, the need for a stimulative
stance will inevitably recede as the expansion con-
tinues to gain momentum. However, it may not be
easy to reverse this stance as a result of the institu-
tional context in which fiscal tools are used.
Part of the fiscal armory can be redirected very
quickly — these are the so-called automatic stabilizers.
These programs expand and contract more or less
automatically in response to changes in the pace at
which the economy is expanding. Such programs in-
clude unemployment colnpensation, ‘cs’elfare programs,
housing subsidies, and the progressive nature of the
Federal tax structure. In addition, since interest rates
are generally lower at cyclical troughs than at peaks,
the rate at which future benefits of government proj-
ects are discounted falls, increasing the present values
of many projects and programs. These automatically
increase outlays when the economy slows and reduce
them as expansion progresses.
While automatic stabilizers make an important con-
tribution to overall stabilization policy, often further
fiscal changes are desired, either to add more stimulus
or to moderate further a buoyant expansion. This is a
Inuch more difficult undertaking, because it is very
difficult to change the posture of fiscal policy in either
direction quickly.
First of all, new programs require Congressional
approval, and this approval must be in a form which
in fact provides for the actions sought by the Admin-
istration. Bills are sometimes changed in committee or
on the floor of Congress in ways which significantly
redirect their thrusts.
Similar considerations govern tax legislation. Con-
gress has shown so much reluctance to raise taxes as
to make the possibility of a peacetime hike really
very questionable. Even lowering taxes takes a long
time, and inevitably there are pressures to diverge
further from an optimal tax system whenever any
taxes are modified.
Transfer payments, although outlays rather than
taxes, are (with the exception of automatic stabilizers)
subject to the same sorts of forces which slow tax
changes. Changes are likely to be a long time coming,
and the temptation to embellish a proposed program
is likely to be considerable. Further, once recipients
become accustomed to the payments (and this may
be one of the fastest adjustments in all economic
behavior), they and their political representatives will
not be anxious to see them withdrawn when the need
for stimulus passes. Discretionary changes in transfer
payments thus tend to be one-way stabilization tools
at best, for use when stimulus is needed.2
There is also an offsetting political force which
tends to limit the feasibility of transfer payments for
stabilization purposes. It might often happen that the
quickest and most efficient method of providing stim-
ulus would be to simply mail everyone a check. The
2
There may be exceptions to this tendency, however. Congress
has in recent years extended unemployment benefits beyond
the norsnal 26-week maximum duration on n temporau’ basis.
This extension may in fact not be permanent. If so, the key
would seem to lie in the fact that the unemployed are a
constantly changing group without organized political
representation.
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distribution of the funds among persons could be
determined by any number of criteria, and this might
well be more efficient than increasing expenditures on
marginal projects or accelerating work on existing
projects beyond its most efficient pace. Rightly or
wrongly, however, those responsible will likely wishto
“get something more” for the money spent, in the
interests of “efficiency,” even though they might favor
a tax cut of the same amount,
In the area of spending, most projects span several
years and require long periods to start up and wind
down. This inertia is going to make it very hard to
change the posture of fiscal policy quickly in coming
years.
Spending pressures conic from several sources. First,
there are some bills proposed long ago by the Admin-
istration which have finally been passed by the Con-
gress and which are viewed as fundamental to the
Administration’s program. Revenue sharing is perhaps
the best example of such a bill. This program was an
essential part of the President’s concept of a New
Federalism, and its passage was sought by the Admin-
istration. It was designed to usher in a new area of
Federal, state, and local cooperation and capitalize
on the Federal Government’s comparative advantage
at tax collection. For a while it also appeared as
though it would provide useful fiscal stimulus.
As it happened, the bill was passed in a form gen-
erally acceptable to the Administration, but the need
for fiscal stimulus is much smaller than it was several
quarters ago. This need is likely to diminish further
as the program continues,
It also comes at a time when the Federal budget is
seriously in deficit and state and local governments
are running surpluses, a state of affairs not foreseen
when the program was proposed.
Fiscal pressures are also coming from the Congress
in the form of bills involving a level of spending far
above what the Administration wants. Perhaps the
best example here is the Clean Water Bill, which
authorizes expenditures exceeding $24 billion over as
little as three years in order to achieve environmental
goals far in excess of reasonable standards.
In addition, the Administration has decided to re-
sist tax increases in 1973 and beyond. This position
is based on philosophical considerations, on a firm
belief that tax increases in the near future are very
unlikely to be enacted, and on a belief that the
American people do not want a tax increase,
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Accordingly, the scene is set for some friction in
the fiscal area, If spending bills continue to be passed
and existing programs continue their tendencies to-
ward expansion, something will have to give.
The give will conic in the form of vetos, impound-
ing of funds, budget restraint, and/or inflation, (In-
flation in most cases could be avoided by an appropri-
ate restrictive monetary policy, but if spending in-
creases are truly substantial such a policy would be
difficult to implement because it would imply very
high levels of interest rates for a time.)
If spending increases arc voted and vetos are over-
ridden the first result will likely be attempts to im-
pound the funds — simply not spend the appropriated
funds. If this does not prove effective, the next result
will almost certainly be inflation. Later on taxes might
he boosted to finance the spending, but inflation will
likely have accelerated.
Tire .Fri.tu.re Seüpe Got nrraen.•t
.Jcti7tL.~eS 0. ..LI flGfli.~
The second main issue on the fiscal side essentially
involves the size of the government sector. Studies by
the Brookings Institution, the American Enterprise
Institute and others show that with the existing tax
strncturc we will be lucky to be able to finance existing
programs (with their legislated growth) over the next
five years.3 There is very little room for any new
initiatives unless taxes are raised or other programs
are reduced.
The government is getting very large. The propor-
tion of GNP that runs through government budgets
has been steadily rising. In 1956, Federal, state, and
local nondefense spending was 15 percent of GNP.
In 1971 it svas 23.6 percent of what full employment
GNP would have been. The proportion has increased
in even’ year but one since 1956,
Since it is virtually unimaginable that a year could
go by without the development of pressing new
“needs” to be met by the Government, the fiscal area
is likely to witness considerable tension for some years
to come.
Some fundamental decisions are going to have to
be made on the appropriate role of government and
how extensive its participation in the economy should
3
Charles L. Schultze et, al., Setting National Priorities; The
1973 Budget (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
1972) and David J. Ott et al., Nixon, McGovern, and the
Federal Budget (Washington, D.C.: American Entes’prise
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be. These decisions will have to be made by whoever
is President.
Monetary policy will also have an important role to
play in coming years if we are to attain a sustainable
high-level of expansion. While it is almost trivial to
state that monetary policy must be neither too rapid
nor too slow when account is taken of fiscal policy,
this turns out to be much easier said than done.
There is of course first a problem in knowing \vhat
rate of monetary growth is appropriate. This problem
should not be minimized, but it should be the subject
of a separate discussion all its own. In any case, there
have been instances in the past where nearly all
theoretical approaches were in agreement as to the
appropriate monetary course. However, the problem
came in the execution of such a policy.
.iirI~COroU;n.g V;/ ~r trig
/ S
Over the long run, attaining an appropriate mone-
tary growth rate has not been a serious problem.
Historically, growth rates have not averaged extreme
levels over periods of three yeams and longer. And
even if they did, the economy could probably adjust
to these extreme rates more satisfactorily the less
acute were tile short-run variations around the trend.
The problem for monetary policy has been to make
week-to-week and month-to-month policy compatible
with quarter-to-quarter and year-to-year policy.
The first challenge for policymakcrs is identifying
true nonseasonal variation in monetary aggregates.
Seasonal adjustment of economic time series is a com-
plex process, and the finest available techniques arc
used on the money stock, Still, some traces of seasonal
regularity occasionally appear in seasonally adjusted
data. As an example, from 1967 to 1971 the average
rate of growth of seasonally adjusted M1 (currency
plus demand deposits adjusted, based on quarterly
averages) in the fourth quarter was below those for
both the second and third quarters. In 1.966 it was
higher than the third quarter (0.2 percent versus
—0.7 percent) hut both \vere far below rates for the
first and second quarter. This pattern held for 1972
as well. While this example is not by itself sufficient
evidence of inadequate seasonal adjustment, it does
suggest that considerable care be exercised in adjust-
ing for seasonalvariation.
Even with perfect seasonal adjustment, it would
still be very difficult to maintain a specified monetary
growth rate from week to week. Although there is
considerable predictability in the money stock, data
on money are available only with a one week lag, so
that precise weekly control is not entirely feasible.
Furthennore, it is not clear that such precise short-
run control is actually necessary. There is wide-
spread professional belief that extreme rates of mone-
tary growth over periods as long as two quarters will
not seriously hurt the economy if followed by an equal
period of offsetting groxvth. That is, this view holds
that if money grows at a 10 percent rate for two
quarters and then at a 2 percent rate for the sub-
sequent two quarters, the effects will be roughly the
same within a few quarters as if the rate had been
6 percent throughout. (I believe that the selection of
a two-quarter period is based largely on intuition, but
this is more than can be said for, say, a four-quarter
period. Whatever the length of the period is, it is
likely longer than a month, even though some observ-
ers see scope for fine tuning with monthly variations
in monetary growth).
There is thus room for ssvings in the money stock
over brief periods without really compromising six-
month period goals. The probleni, however, is in
maintaining compatibility between week-to-week be-
havior and multi-quarter goals. The longer the weekly
series diverges from a desired path, the longer and/or
sharper will be the required offsetting policy.
This might not appear to be a severe problem, but
it has the potential to be one for at least two reasons.
First, it is difficult to establish trends from looking at
weekly data due to the random fluctuations of any
statistical series over a short period. If the series is
running below target, it is easy to believe that without
any policy actions it will soon hit the target path.
Second, since the money stock cannot be controlled
over a week, a two-tiered intermediate target scheme
has been established, The ultimate goals of monetary
policy are formulated in terms of GNP, employment,
output, prices, the balance of payments, and the like,
But since these are somewhat remote from the in-
strumnents under Federal Reserve control, an inter-
mediate target variable is used. Such a variable ideally
stands somewhere in the transmission process and is
more or less closely influenced by the Federal Reserve.
Various variables have been used for this purpose in
the past, including member bank borrowings from the
Federal Reserve, free reserves, and, most of all, mar-
ket interest rates.
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From the 1950s until early 1970, various short-term
interest rates were the intermediate target (some-
times sharing center stage with free reserves). In 1970
the monetary growth rate superseded interest rates
as the intermediate target. But since the growth rate
of money could not be controlled weekly, the System
Open Market Account Manager was given a daily or
weekly Federal funds rate target to establish in order
to reach this desired monetary growth rate. Thus,
short-term interest rates continued to be the day-to-
day operating target. While the emphasis of policy
in some sense had shifted to monetary aggregates,
policy still depended on the Federal Reserve System’s
ability to predict the relationship between interest
rates and the monetary growth rate as well as its
ability to influence market interest rates.
When the problems of identifying a trend in money,
identifying a trend in interest rates, predicting the
effect of the latter on the former, and controlling in-
terest rates are combined, there is considerable room
for deviation from a target monetary growth rate.
This was seen perhaps most vividly in 1971. After
the first two months of the year, recorded monetary
policy was largely directed at lowering the monetary
growth rate. Federal Reserve predictions implied that
the rate should have fallen in the second quarter,
based on prevailing Federal funds rates. Yet the
money stock rose at a 10.2 percent annual rate from
December to June — much faster than desired or pre-
dicted. Essentially the reverse occurred in the second
half, and the money stock rose at a 0.8 percent rate
after July.
In 1972 the Federal Reserve moved further to
increase the compatibility of weekly movements and
quarterly targets by adopting reserves available to
support private nonbank deposits (RPDs) as its daily
operating target There is not a perfectly stable rela-
tionship between RPD growth and monetary growth,
and we may be able to do better by using the mone-
tary base or something else. But this connection is
much closer than that between the Federal funds rate
and the mnonetary growth rate, The adoption of RPDs
therefore marks an important step toward more man-
ageable and accurate monetary policy.
The I’mblerrm. Ol Laos
This is especially important in light of the lags in
the effect of monetary policy on the economy. While
these lags have long been widely recognized, it was
generally thought that to the extent they are predicta-
ble, policy could be operated to take account of these
lags, and thus the monetary growth rate could be
managed. Some recent work in this area suggests
that this too may be easier said than done.4 Even
without uncertainty about the length and variability
of the lags in the effect of monetary changes, a full
offsetting of past swings in monetary growth can eas-
ily require huge oscillating swings in the monetary
rate, with accompanying perturbation for capital mar-
kets, In some cases, the system can even become ex-
plosive, requiring alternately increasing opposite rates
of growth from quarter to quarter. When uncertainty
is added, the whole business is extremely hazardous.
CGr-TCLUSIOJN.
The moral here, I think, is that monetary policy is
not really appropriate for month-to-month or quarter-
to-quarter fine tuning the way some people thought
a few years ago. Probably its optimal role is to pro-
vide a generally expansive, restrictive, or in some
sense neutral environment over a period of at least
several quarters. Siniilar considerations hold for fiscal
policy. If we can coordinate the two to avoid sharp
shifts, we can probably minimize all quarterly fluctua-
tions in GNP over a period of several quarters and
years. This would be a very sizable accomplishment.
4
Philip Cagan and Anna J. Schwartz, “How Feasible is a
Flexible Monetary Policy” (Paper presented at a conference
in honor of Milton Friedman, Charlottesville, Virginia, Octo-
ber 20, 1972).
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